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It is unclear whether the distinction between U.S.  foreign exchange intervention and 
newspaper reports of  such activity is important.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) argue that 
unreported intervention has a weaker impact on the market.  In this paper, we ask the 
empirical question:  If  intervention is reported (was actual), does it matter whether it 
occurred (was reported)?  For a subsample for both the yen-to-dollar and Deutschemark-to- 
dollar exchange rates, we reject the hypothesis that the impact of intervention on the variance 
does not depend on whether it was reported. We also find that the sign of the impact depends 
on whether the intervention was reported. In addition, we uncover some evidence for impacts 
of false reports of intervention. We suggest that remaining concerns about these distinctions 
should be focused on the market microstructure surrounding the actual intervention 
operations. 
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The release of  official data on daily U.S.  central bank foreign exchange operations 
has brought about an increase in the number of  studies analyzing the impacts of intervention 
on the level and volatility of exchange rates.  Prior to the release of  such data, empirical 
studies of intervention relied on confidential daily data or on daily data culled from 
newspaper reports, or else opted to study intervention at lower frequencies using stock 
measures of private-sector holdings of  government bonds denominated in different 
currencies. 
The overall fmding of the empirical studies (see Dominguez and Frankel [I9931 and 
Edison [I9931 for summaries) is that if  intervention affects exchange rates, it probably does 
so through a signaling, or expectations, channel.  This channel implies that intervention 
conveys information to the market about future monetary policy.  The literature has discussed 
a variety of conditions that may  be required before such a policy can be effective.  One issue 
that has not been addressed in much detail, however, is whether the accuracy of the market's 
information about intervention, or any implied asymmetry in the market's information, 
influences the efficacy of  intervention. It is possible that the way  in which the authorities 
intervene may play an important role in the outcome of  intervention operations. 
In this paper, we  analyze the differential impacts of  reported and actual U.S. 
intervention on the mean and conditional variance of  the Deutschemark-to-dollar (DM/$) and 
yen-to-dollar (Yen/$) exchange rates. We utilize a GARCH framework to model the 
conditional variance, test for day-of-the-week effects, and then look for the impact of  either 
reported or actual intervention. We report tests of the restrictions imposed by  studies that 
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occurred, it doesn't matter whether it was reported, and 2) if intervention was reported, it 
doesn't matter whether it occurred.  Somewhat surprisingly, once we have accounted for 
day-of-the-week effects, we fmd  that only reported intervention has an impact over the full 
sample periods, and it is only on the variance of  the yen-to-dollar exchange rate. In addition, 
the distinction between intervention that was not reported and intervention that was  reported 
is significant for the conditional variance in a subsample for both exchange rates. 
Furthermore, we fmd some evidence that both false reports and missing reports of 
intervention occasionally affect exchange rates. 
The paper is organized as follows:  In the next section, we discuss related work and 
clarify the issues.  In the second and thud sections, we describe institutional factors and the 
data, respectively. Then, in the fourth section we present our empirical method.  The fifth 
section presents and discusses the results of  our empirical analysis, and the final section 
summarizes our fmdings and indicates what we believe are the remaining issues. 
I. Related Literature 
When analyzing daily U.S. intervention operations, it is conventional to use reported 
data if the intention is to focus on the signaling channel (the role of  intervention in 
communicating the Federal Reserve's intentions regarding monetary policy), but to use actual 
data if the interpretation is to be in terms of  portfolio balan~e.~  For example, if intervention 
signals monetary policy, a purchase of  dollars may  be interpreted as indicating that monetary 
policy will increase interest rates and thus raise the exchange value of  the dollar.  If portfolio 
balance is the mechanism, a purchase of  dollars (if sterilized) forces the private sector to 
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on such securities, and thus a decrease in the risk premi~m.~  A handful of  studies have now 
utilized both the reported and actual daily U. S. data. However, there has been little 
discussion of the relevance of the mechanism through which information about intervention is 
conveyed to the average trader. 
Klein (1993) estimates the probability of intervention having occurred, given that it 
was reported in either The Wall Street Journal or The New  York Times, and the probability 
of it having been reported, given that it occurred. His estimates are 88 and 72 percent, 
respectively.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) perform a sequential search of intervention 
news from three newspapers (The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and The New  York 
Times) and analyze the impact of reported intervention that occurred and "secret" 
intervention (actual intervention that was not reported) on the exchange rate.  They find that 
the impact of  secret intervention is weaker than that of reported intervention, but is still 
significant. Dominguez (1993) analyzes the impact of reported and secret U.S. intervention 
on exchange rate volatility using a GARCH(1 ,  1)-student-t distribution.  Hung (199 1) also 
discusses the relative effectiveness of  "discreet" and "overt" intervention.  Osterberg and 
Wetmore Humes (1993) compare actual intervention to intervention reported in The Wall 
Street Journal and find that the difference between the two is not white noise. 
11.  Institutional Considerations 
Consideration of the details of U.S. intervention operations is important for 
interpreting the estimated impacts of actual and reported intervention in studies of the 
efficacy of U.S. foreign exchange  intervention^.^  Data on U.S. intervention operations are 
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of  New  York are accomplished via either commercial banks or brokers. If commercial banks 
are utilized, they are expected to notify the wire services that the Fed is in the market 
immediately after the order has been placed.  However, if the Fed contacts brokers directly, 
notification is not expected, and the Fed's presence in the market will not be automatically 
re~ealed.~  Humpage (1994) indicates that since the mid-1980s, the Federal Reserve has 
generally relied more on commercial banks than on brokers. 
Three uncertainties complicate the interpretation of  newspaper reports of intervention. 
First, it is not clear how  often the Fed utilizes brokers directly.  Second, it is not clear how 
much time passes between the call from the Fed and the average trader learning of  the 
intervention. Third, it is not clear how  the newspapers obtain their information about 
intervention activity.  Klein (1993) cites one source as indicating that traders generally 
inform the newspapers of  intervention activity.  However, another source told us of  the 
existence of  "information brokers" who collect information about market developments 
through informal channels, then disseminate it to paying customers.  Thus, it is not clear if 
reported intervention corresponds to that accomplished via commercial banks, or even to the 
information of  the average trader. 
Newspaper reports about intervention are often vague.  Among the ambiguities are the 
following: 1) specific  currencies are often not mentioned; 2) reports may be delayed, 
implying that segments of the market may not have learned of  the intervention quickly; 
3) one country may intervene on behalf of another, but it is not clear how  the market 
interprets such reports; and 4) intervention may  have been rumored but then discounted. 
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that news of actual intervention reaches the average trader (unless the intervention utilizes 
brokers) may imply a relatively liberal coding.  On the other hand, in order to focus on the 
impact of any asymmetry in the market's information about intervention, one may wish to 
employ more conservative coding conventions. 
III. Data 
The official daily U.S.  intervention data were supplied to us by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  These data are now  available to the public with a 
one-year lag.  The data are given as the daily net purchases of the U.S.  dollar vis-A-vis the 
Deutschemark or yen.  The exchange rate data were supplied by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New  York and are quoted as of  10:OO a.m. New  York time. We culled the reported 
intervention series from The Wall Street Journal, as described in detail in Osterberg and 
Wetmore Humes (1993). 
It is worth emphasizing that other researchers have utilized different series on 
reported intervention. Dominguez and Frankel (1993) searched The Wall Street Journal, 
Financial Times, and The New  York Times sequentially for reports of  intervention. Klein 
(1993) utilizes reports from The Wall Street Journal and The New  York Times. Like us, 
Bonser-Neal and Tanner rely on The Wall Street Journal. 
Our data include only specific reports of U.S.  dollar intervention as published in the 
foreign exchange column of The Wall Street Journal. Compared to other compilations of 
reported intervention, our tabulations are conservative. Numerous judgments must be made 
in coding newspaper reports.  For example, we do not include reports of U.S. intervention 
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intervention that did not appear until later than the next working day. Other aspects of the 
data collection procedure are discussed in Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993).  It is not 
clear how other researchers dealt with these issues. 
The sample period is August 6, 1985 through September 5, 1991 for the DM/$, and 
August 5, 1985 through October 4, 1991 for the Yen/$.6  However, since previous 
investigations have noted that the goals of intervention vary from one period to another 
(Humpage and Osterberg [1992], Dorninguez and Frankel [1993]), we estimated our model 
for the following subperiods:  February 23 to October 18, 1987, October 19, 1987 to 
February 19, 1990, and February 20, 1990 to September 5, 1991 (DM/$) or October 4, 1991 
(Yen/$). 
IV. Methodological Approach 
Ideally, we would utilize intradaily data identifying the counterparties, the time of 
intervention, quotes surrounding the intervention, wire service entries, and newspaper 
reports. However, the identities of the counterparties are not available, and the other 
information is relatively costly to obtain, except for short sample periods. Consequently, we 
opt for a more modest approach, albeit one that has the advantage of being directly 
comparable to previous empirical investigations. In order to focus on the relevance of 
asymmetry in the market's information about intervention, we test two null hypotheses: 
HI:, If intervention occurred, it does not matter if it was reported. 
H2:  If intervention was reported, it does not matter if it occurred. 
Failure to reject H1 might lessen concerns that the efficacy of intervention is 
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through) the market. One could interpret failure to reject Hl(H2), combined with rejection of 
H2(H1), as implying that whether intervention had occurred (was reported) was more 
important than whether it was reported (had occurred). 
We analyze the first difference of the logarithm of the exchange rate. This follows 
Baillie and Bollersev (1989) and others who have found unit roots in daily exchange rates. 
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In equation (I), there are five dummy variables.  DOWtl = 1 if day t is a Monday, and i = 
2,3,4,5 correspond to Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and days before market holidays, 
respectively.  As has been noted by McFarland, Pettit, and Sung (1982), Baillie and 
Bollersev (1989), and Hsieh (1988, 1989), daily exchange rates (and even their volatility) can 
be different for different days of the week.  This may be due to variation in the volume of 
trading and in the flow of information. 
The conditional variance equation is modeled as GARCH(1, I), and we allow the 
conditional density D to be either normal or student-t. Bollersev (1987) discusses the 
estimation of this type of model.  Bollersev (1986), Hsieh (1989), and Baillie and Bollersev 
(1989) conclude that the GARCH(1 ,  1)-student-t formulation does better than its competitors 
in modeling daily exchange rate movements. 
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each currency (DM/$ and Yen/$), we  defme both buying and selling and classify intervention 
as "~ccurate"  (occurred and was reported), "_missing" (occurred but was not reported), or 
"Jkke" (did not occur but was reported). 
Thus, to test H1 and H2, we modify equations (1) and (3) as follows: 
where the variable def~tions  are as described in table 1.  Testing H1 and H2 implies testing 
the restrictions that the coefficients on the variables for "accurate" and "missing," as well as 
on "accurate" and  "fake, " are equal, respectively. 
V.  Results 
Table 2 reports the number of  occurrences of  each intervention measure.  For the full 
sample periods, only 17 percent and 16 percent of actual U.S. intervention vis-A-vis the DM 
and yen, respectively, were reported in the foreign exchange column of  The Wall Street 
Journal.  This is lower than the percentages calculated by  other researchers. The fnst 
subperiod (time 3), from February 23, 1987 through October 18, 1987, begins after the 
Louvre Accord and ends just prior to the stock market decline on October 19. Almost all 
U.S.  intervention activity here consisted of  buying dollars, either by  selling DM  or by  selling 
yen.  In contrast, from October 19, 1987 through February 19, 1990, most U.S. intervention 
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intervention, with some tendency to sell DM  (buy dollars in terms of DM) and buy yen (sell 
dollars for yen). 
Table 3a reports the results of tests for the GARCH(1,l)-student-t specification,  for 
the inclusion of  dummies, and for including intervention in the conditional mean equation. 
For the full sample period for both currencies, line 1 shows that the GARCH(1,l) 
specification  improves on including only intercepts when the disturbance is assumed to be 
normally distributed.  Line 2 indicates that the student-t distribution improves upon 
normality. For both currencies, specification tests suggest the joint addition of the five day- 
of-the-week variables (Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and days before market 
holidays) to the conditional mean and conditional variance (line 5).'  Results for the 
subperiods generally confirm these interpretations.  Except for the extremely short third 
sample period for the DM, tests of the GARCH(1,l)-student-t specification  suggest its 
acceptance.  However, day-of-the-week effects are not present for the DM/$ for the first and 
second subperiods. 
Lines 6 through 9 of table 3a report the results of our main tests. Lines 6 and 7 test 
our two main hypotheses:  HI) If intervention was reported, it does not matter if it occurred, 
and H2) If intervention occurred, it does not matter if it was reported. We reject H1 at the 
0.05 level for the final subperiod for the Yen/$. Lines 8 and 9 provide some perspective on 
this result by indicating the test statistics for the overall signifcance of reported intervention 
and of actual intervention, respectively.  Contrary to the results of previous research, neither 
measure of  intervention usually affects the DM/$ or Yen/$. Only for the final subperiod for 
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when entered as a single variable, imposing the restriction that whether or not the 
intervention is reported does not matter. Reported intervention also matters, if we  are careful 
to distinguish between reports that are accurate and those that are not. However, the low 
frequency of  intervention during this period qualifies  these results. 
Table 3b reports test results for impacts of  intervention on the conditional variance. 
For the full sample period, actual intervention affects the Yen/$, and it does not matter if 
such intervention is reported. For the subperiods, we frnd more evidence for impacts of 
intervention. For the October 19, 1987 - February 19, 1990 subperiod for the DM/$, 
intervention influences the variance and, importantly, we also reject H2, frnding that the 
impact of  actual intervention that was reported (A) differs from the impact of  actual 
intervention that was not reported (M). However, we cannot reject H1 for this case. 
For the same period as discussed above, we reject H2 for the Yen/$. If we restrict 
intervention that was reported to have the same impact as intervention that was not reported, 
we  would conclude that actual intervention does not influence the conditional variance (line 
9). Thus, in this case, actual intervention matters if we are careful to distinguish between 
whether or not it was reported. 
The table 4 tabulations of  coefficient estimates focus on the second subsample, for 
which we frnd impacts of  intervention on the variance for both exchange rates. The 
significance of  the day-of-the-week dummies is sensitive to specification. The conditional 
means of  the DM/$ and Yen/$ are significantly  higher (at the 10 percent level as measured 
by  the t statistic) on Thursdays only when accurate reports (R) and missing reports (M) are 
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is included in the latter. The conditional mean is also significantly  higher on Fridays, but is 
lower on days before market holidays for the Yen/$ when R+M is included in the 
conditional variance. The conditional variance is higher for the DM/$ only when R and M 
are included separately in the conditional variance equation, but is lower for the Yen/$ only 
when R+M is included in the conditional variance equation. 
The fnst column of table 4 shows that the impact of accurate reports (A) is negative 
for the DM/$, while the impact of missing reports (M) is positive. Although the individual t 
statistics are not significantly  different from zero at the 10 percent level, table 3b reported 
that the two measures are jointly significant. The second column shows that the overall 
impact of actual intervention (A+M) is positive.  The third and fourth columns confirm this 
finding for the Yen/$; accurate reports have a negative impact on the conditional variance, 
while missing reports (M) have a positive impact. 
VI.  Conclusion 
A limited amount of previous research has compared actual U.S.  central bank 
intervention with the newspaper reports of such activities.  Using a GARCH(1  ,l)-student-t 
specification  of the daily exchange rate process for the DM/$ and Yen/$, official U.S. 
intervention vis-a-vis the Deutschemark and yen, and The Wall Street Journal reports of  U.S. 
intervention, we confirm previous fmdings that the impact of intervention seems to be sample 
dependent. We fmd that 1) except for the February 19, 1990 - September 5, 1991 subperiod 
for the Yen/$, neither the distinction between accurate reports of  intervention and false 
reports (given that intervention was reported) nor the distinction between accurate reports and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9501.pdfmissing reports (given that intervention occurred) is significant in terms of the conditional 
mean; 2) for October 19, 1987 through February 19, 1990, actual intervention influences the 
conditional variance for both exchange rates, and the impact depends on whether the 
intervention was reported; and 3) for the latter subperiod, intervention that was reported 
decreased the conditional variance for both currencies, while intervention that was not 
reported increased the conditional variance. 
Compared to the results of previous research, our findings show that intervention has 
relatively little impact overall. One possible partial explanation is that we  have recorded too 
few reports of intervention.  Our response to this is to note that a relatively liberal coding of 
the reports may  not be consistent with our desire to proxy for any informational asymmetries 
within the market. On one hand, viewing any difference between our reported intervention 
series and other researchers'  series as measurement error could explain our finding that 
reported intervention does not affect exchange rates overall. On the other hand, the finding 
that actual intervention has no impact on exchange rates is not subject to this criticism. We 
investigated the possibility that including day-of-the-week effects may  have influenced our 
res~lts.~  We ran probits where the dependent variables are the intervention measures, either 
reported intervention (the sum of accurate andme) or actual intervention (the sum of 
accurate and missing), and the independent variables are the day-of-the-week and holiday 
dummies, with an intercept.  For no case is there any tendency for intervention either to 
occur or to be reported on any particular day of the week or on days before market holidays. 
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1. These latter stock measures are utilized to test the portfolio balance 
theory of how intervention would affect exchange rates. For a recent empirical 
application, see Ghosh (1992)  . 
2. There is no coherent view of what signaling means. For some, it means that 
there is a "consistent and proximate" relation between intervention and some 
future change in monetary policy  (Klein  and Rosengren [19911). For others, it 
means that intervention influences exchange rates, given any portfolio balance 
effect  (Ghosh [I9921 . 
3. Sterilization means that the removal of the dollars via the initial 
purchase is offset by the purchase of U.S. government securities of the same 
amount. 
4. Humpage (1994) discusses the institutional aspects of U.S. intervention 
operations, focusing on the nexus between the Federal Reserve's  actual 
transacting from its New York Desk and the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury.  Todd (1992) details the historical evolution 
of the rationales for U.S. intervention operations. 
5. See Dominguez and Frankel (1993,  pp.72-73)  and Humpage  (1994,  pp. 9-10). 
6. The sample periods for the three investigations are roughly consistent: 
Klein (1993)  : January 1, 1985-December  31, 1989; Bonser-Neal  and Tanner 
(forthcoming)  : January 1,  1985-December  31, 1989; this paper: August 6,  1985- 
September 5,  1991. 
7. Earlier sample periods could not be analyzed due to the low number of 
occurrences of most of the categories of intervention. 
8. The coefficient estimates indicate a "Thursday"  effect. Since our day-of- 
the-week  dummies are aligned with day t-1,  our Thursday effect is equivalent 
to others' Friday effects. 
9.  There has been no consistent treatment of these effects. Dominguez (1993) 
includes a full array of day-of-the-week  and holiday dummies, but Dominguez 
and Frankel (1993) include no such dummies, and Bonser-Neal  and Tanner 
(forthcoming)include only a dummy for holidays or weekends. 
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m-b  I equals 1 if U.S.  actually bought dollars but was not reported to be doing so 
I 
Definition 
equals 1 if day t is a Wednesday 
equals 1  if day t is a Thursday 
equals 1 if  day t is a Friday 
equals 1 if day t is the day before a holiday 
equals 1  if U.S.  actually bought dollars and was also reported to be doing so 
a-s 
1  m-s  I equals 1  if U.S.  actually sold dollars but was not reported to be doing so 
equals 1 if U.S.  actually sold dollars and was also reported to be doing so 
f-b  I equals 1 if U.S.  was  not buying dollars but was reported to be doing so 
I 
f-s  I equals 1 if U.S.  was not selling dollars but was reported to be doing so 
I 
A  I equals 1 if U.S.  was either buying or selling dollars and was reported to be 
I 
M  1  equals 1 if U.S.  was either buying or selling dollars but was not reported to be 
I 
F  I equals 1 if U.S.  was neither buying nor selling dollars but was reported to be 
A+F 
A+M 
equals 1 if U.  S. was reported to be either buying or selling dollars 
equals 1 if U.S.  actually was either buying or selling dollars 
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Full sample: August 6, 1985-September 5, 1991(DM/$) or 
August 6, 1985-October 4, 1991  (Yen/$) 
A: February 23, 1987-October 18, 1987 
B: October 19, 1987-February 19, 1990 
C: February 20, 1990-September 5, 1991 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9501.pdfTable 3a: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Specification (Intervention in the Mean) 
A:  February 23, 1987-October 18, 1987 
B:  October 19, 1987-February 19, 1990 
C: February 20, 1990-September 5, 1991 
d.  f. : degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio test 
a : significant at the 0.05 level. 
: significant at the 0.10 level. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9501.pdfTable 3b: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Specification  (Intervention in the Variance) 
A:  February 23, 1987-October 18, 1987 
B:  October 19, 1987-February 19, 1990 
C: February 20, 1990-September 5, 1991 
d.f.: degrees of  freedom for the likelihood ratio test 
" : significant  at the 0.05 level. 
: significant at the 0.10 level. 
" : 1 degree of  freedom 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
Sample + 
DM/$ 
6) HI: A = F 




6)Hl: A = F 
7) H2:  A = M 
8)A+F=0 
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*  significant at  the 0.10 level. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 







No. of obs. 
-0.0637 
(0.0528) 
0.0502 
(0.0307) 
0.0478 
(0.0001)* 
-0.1220 
3.6674 
574 
0.0217 
(0.0203) 
0.0963 
(0.0068)* 
-0.1047 
3.6999 
574 
-3.7351 
(6.2749) 
10.9650 
(5.2077)* 
0.2710 
(0.0135)* 
-0.0059 
4.8643 
562 
6.0296 
(3.0353)* 
0.1754 
(0.0001)* 
0.011793 
5.01577 
562 
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